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Toward a Critical
Postmodernist Pedagogy
of Liberation
By Peter McLaren
and Rhonda Hammer
The Postmodern Condition
and the Pedagogical Challenge
Work within the field of critical pedagogy
is currently being undertaken in the United States
and Canada during what we consider a precipitous
and precarious time. The present historical juncture
may be singled out as a moment of particular
urgency and importance for the future of democracy
as we bear witness to two conflicting potentialities
which manifest themselves in the struggle on an
increasing worldwide basis between democratic
forms of social life and those which can be labelled
totalitarian and autocratic. A significant dimension
of this crisis involves the politics of meaning and
representation. We call attention to the present
cultural logic or sensibility currently organizing
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aspects of everyday life, a logic which has been variously theorized under the
term ''postmodern." Recognizing that there exists a lack of shared understanding of what constitutes a "real" postmodern political or cultural agenda, we
use the term here only in its most general sense to refer to, among other
things, the rupturing of the unitary fixity and homogenizing logic of the grand
narratives of Western European thought--what Lyotard refers to as the grands
recits of modernity (the dialectic of Spirit, the emancipation of the worker, the
accumulation of wealth, the steady march of progress leading to the classless
society, and the mastery of nature, etc.). We have also included under this
term the cultural reproduction of subjects out of the consumer myths and
images fed by the global dispersion of capital, the social construction of
unfixed identities and the levelling of the opposition between high art and
popular art. In a ~ery broad sense, we are also .usin~ this term to suggest t~e
rejection of truth claims that have a grounding in a transcendent reality
independent of collective human existence, an abandonment of the teleology
of science, the construction of lifestyles out of consumer products and cultural
bricolage, and cultural forms of communication and social relations that have
evolved from the disorganization of capitalism.
The debate surrounding postmodernity is not only gathering
momentum in literary journals, but also in journals dealing with social theory,
cultural studies, education, and legal studies. 1 A central thesis of postmo~er
nism is that meaning is increasingly becoming severed from representation.
Peter Burger puts it thus: "in our society the sign no longer refers to a
signified but always only to other signs, .so that we no longer encounter
anything like meaning with our speech, but only move in an endless chain of
signifiers" (1989: 124). In other words, the unity of the sign and its ability to
anchor meaning has been significantly weakened. The average individual lacks
a language for making sense of everyday life. Burger writes that
The modern culture industry robs individuals of 'languages' for interpreting self
and world by denying them the media for
organizing their own experiences. The
consciousness industry does represent a
public sphere of production, but one that
takes consciousness as 'raw material' or
that constantly tries to sever the connection
between concrete experiences and consciousness. (1984: xxviii-xxvix).
Lawrence Grossberg (1988b: 180) echoes this theme when he writes
that:
Contemporary ideological structures seem
incapable of making sense of certain affective experiences... But this does not mean
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that we do not continue to live within and

~xperie':'ce ourse.lves in terms of particular

ideological meanings and values; simply that
these are increasingly unrelated to our affective moods, that they cannot speak to
them.
. As ";result of the postmodern condition, the alienation of the subject
assOCtated with modernism has been replaced by the fragmentation of the
subject,.what Madan Sarup (1989), citing literary critic Fredric Jameson and
econom1?t Er~est ~ande~ refers to as "a refusal to engage with the present
or to t~ hist?n~y... a ~andom ~nil;ialization of all the styles of the
past..._(an increasing incapacity) of fashiomng representations of our current
e".P"nences ...[and] the penetration and colonization of Nature and the Unconscmus by contemporary forms of multinational capitalism" (1989: 145). Unlike
S~up, however, we d.o not hold that post-structuralist/postmodernist theories
which have emerged '':'.recent years to engage and explore our location within
the pos~modern ~on~ition are necessarily antagonistic to the project of self
and social emancipation.
In.our view, postmod~rnity positions us within the tension produced
by m?dermst and po?tmoderms~ attempts to resolve the living contradiction
of being both the subject and object of meaning. We refer here to two distinct
ways of ord.ering rea~ty discussed 1?Y David Holt (1989: 174). Holt describes
these ord~rings as be~g reflected in th.e following questions: Does meaning
gener.ate life or does life ~en~rate i:ne~g? The first question is posed within
t~e d1Scourse of modermty in which 1t IS assumed that our lives should be
lived .out as a_n exp!anat!on of a meaning prior to life, a transcendental
meall;1ng that is codified in a conception of metaphysical truth. The latter
question reflects the advent of postmodernity and the shattering of the notion
of "tr~th". base~ on i:ne~aphysical assumptions. To live life as if it generated
meam~ is t~ live within the contingency and uncertainty of the present a
prese':'t in which ethics, tradition, and agency are revealed to be social ~n
struct.10ns or cultural fictions. Livin~ within the tension created by these two
quest~ons generates further quesltons: Do we act in order to represent
meanm~ or do we. act ~or the sake of the possible effects of our actions?
Does. action create identity ?r does act~on follow from identity? While these
qu~shons have alwa~s occup.•ed the projects engaged in over the centuries by
phtlos?phers of various stnpe, the postmodern condition has turned our
at~ention more boldly to the interface between such questions. Throughout
t1i!5. paper we try to em~hasize that it is the educator's task to help students
critically engage the pohtics and ideologies which inform these questions as
stude?ts begin to. underst:in.d themselves as both a product and producer of
mea~mg. We cla!Dl that 1t IS precisely by critically engaging the dialectical
tens10n between these two questions that we must assume our role as active
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social agents. To live as a critical social agent means knowing how to live
contingently and provisionally without the certainty of knowing the truth, yet
at the same time with the courage to take a stand on issues of human
suffering, domination, and oppression. This is the "postmodern" task of the
critical educator--to live with courage and conviction with the understanding
that knowledge is always partial and incomplete--a task to which this paper
has been directed.
Bauman lists as characteristics of postmodernity "the widespread
aversion to grand social designs, the loss of interest in absolute truths, the
privatization of redemptive urges [e.g., self as opposed to social transformation], the reconciliation with the relative--merely heuristic--value of all life
techniques, the acceptance of the irredeemable plurality of the world"
(1988-89: 39). He notes that these characteristics are a consequence of the
fact that the abolition of strangeness has been raised to the level of a universal human condition.
Ineradicable plurality is now a constitutive quality of existence and
represents a refusal to overcome differences for the sale of saneness. Values
so central to modernity--uniformity and universalism--have become ruptured,
and replaced by coexistence and tolerance. Bauman writes that "in the plural
and pluralistic world of postmodernity, every form of life is permitted on
principle; or, rather, no agreed principles are evident which may render any
form of life impermissible" (p. 40). Gone is the "surgical stance" of attitudes
and policies of institutionalized powers and the opposition between ignorance
over superstition. Bauman distinguishes between the modernist (cognitive)
and postmodernist (post-cognitive) questions. Modernist questions "How can
I interpret this world of which I am a part? And what am I in it?" have been
replaced by postmodernist ones: "Which world is it? What is to be done in it?
Which of my selves is to do it?" (p. 40).

positions which possess both empowering and constraining potential for the
struggle against oppression and the quest for human freedom. While we
welcome the breaking down of grand theories informed by Eurocentric and
patriarchal assumptions and epistemological certainties, we are aware that
questions related to oppression and liberation have a greater propensity to
become lost in a new postmodernist relativism, where the question of "How
can we eliminate suffering?" collapses into the question, "What Is suffering?"
Bauman captures this tension when he writes: "It seems in the world of
universal strangeness the stranger is no longer obsessed with the absoluteness
of what ought to be; nor is he disturbed by the relativity of what is" (p. 42).
.
We do not wish to enter into an extended discussion of postmodermty here, except to note that there are both utopian and distopian currents
to the postmodern condition and post-structuralist theorizing. But what is
important to recognize in this ongoing debate is that postmodernity has
brought with it not only new forms or collective selr-reOexivity but also new
forms or ideological colonization. Critics as diverse as Andreas Huyssen,
Todd Gitlin, and Fredric Jameson have pointed out that postmodernism has
a specifically, though not exclusively, American strain. Corne! West (Stephanson 1988: 276) refers to this strain as "a form of Americanization of the
world," what Anders Stephanson calls "the codification of life in Los Angeles" (p. 276) or what we would refer to as the "Los Angelesization of the
globe." The rise of postmodernism has been materially tied to the rise of
American capital on a global scale, dated to the late 1950s and early 1960s, an
era o~ interimperialist rivalry and multinationalization. It has been argued by
Frednc Jameson, for instance, that the persistence of l'ancien regime in
Europe precluded the same kind of development there, but in the United
Stat~s a whole new system of cultural production emerged and a new,
specifically American cultural apparatus or "cultural dominant" began to
serve as a form of ideological hegemony, forcing Third World countries in the
untenable condition of "catch up" (Stephanson, 1988, 8). While the postwar
Germans, for instance, were busy trying to reappropriate a suppressed modernism, the artistic avant-garde in the United States, faced with "cold war
orthodoxy and corporate-sponsored smugness," launched a direct revolt
"against the officially enshrined modernism of the postwar period" (Gitlin
1989: 105).
Postmodernity has also been described as the era of the death of the
Cartesian subject and a retreat from history. In fact, MacCannell (1989: xiii)
goes so far as to say, following Levi-Strauss, that after Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons by strategic nuclear planners, American society has deemed it too risky to have history and therefore
?as effectively abandoned it as its motive power of development, entering
mstead the "reversible time" of so-called primitive societies which, though
they are immersed in history, nevertheless try to remain impervious to it.
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The so-called cognitive questions, upon closer inspection, turn out not

to be cognitive at all, but questions that "reach beyond the boundaries of
epistemology'' (p. 42); they are fundamentally pre-epistemological. Modernist
questions such as "What is there to be known? Who knows it? How do they
know it and with what degree of certainty?" are replaced by questions which
do not locate the task for the knower but attempt to locate the knower:
"What is a world? What kinds of worlds are there, how are they constituted,
and how do they differ?" (p. 42). Questions demanding certainty, such as
"How is knowledge transmitted from one knower to another, and with what
degree of reliability?" are positioned against "What happens when different
worlds are placed in confrontation, or when boundaries between worlds are
violated?" (p. 42).
We take Bauman's insights into the shift from a modernist quest for
certainty to a postmodernist attempt to understand shifting contexts to be
extremely important, for they speak to a growing tension between these two
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One strand of contemporary postmodernism has grown out of the
juxtaposing currents of American culture: emancipation and the rise of
immigration in the late nineteenth century and assimilation into the American
myth of the melting pot. It is within this type of postmodern juxtaposition that
some critics have argued that "a love for the common people ...[becomes] ...
indistinguishable from contempt" (Gitlin, 1989, 108). This is reflective of
MacCannell's notion that a mere celebration of difference can become really
an insidious higher form of "sucking difference out of difference, a movement
to the still higher ground of the ?Id arrogant W ~st~rn Ego tl1":t wan!' t? s~e
it all, know it all, and take it all m, an Ego that is isolated by its belief m its
own superiority'' (1989, xiv-xv).
.
It is within the context of this discussion that we assert the followmg:
a critical understanding of the relationship between the self and other is one
of the crucial challenges of current pedagogical practices in the age of
postmodernism. This is especially true in light of MacCannell's observation
that two dominant activities shaping world culture are the movement of
institutional capital and tourists to remote regions and "the preparation of the
periphery for their arrival" and, more recently, the "rapid implosion of the
Third World into the First" by which he means the movement of refugees and
displaced peoples ''from the periphery to the centers of power and affluence."
For instance in the case of the United States, MacCannell notes the profound
implications'which follow from cultural implosions such as the following:
Entire villages of Hmong peasants and
hunters, recently from the highlands of
Laos, have been relocated and now live in
apartment complexes in Madison, Wisconsin. Refugees from El Salvador work in
Manhattan, repackaging cosmetics, removing perfume from Christmas gift boxes,
rewrapping them in Valentine boxes. Legal
and illegal "aliens" work the agricultural
fields of California. (1989: xvi).
The implication here for educators is to construct a pedagogy of
"difference" which neither exoticizes nor demonizes the "Other" but rather
seeks to locate difference in both its specificity and ability to provide positions
for critically engaging social relations and cultural practices. (We will return
to the theme of "difference" later on in the paper.)
We wish to point out that, like the cultural theorist Lawrence
Grossberg (1988b), we do not conceive of postmodernity as a "total historical
rupture" that constitutes the ideological representation of late capitalism, the
commodification of our decentered subjectivities, the implosion of the difference between the image and the real, or the collapse of all meta-narratives,
but rather as a sensibility or logic by which we appropriate in the contem-

porary context, cultural practices into our own lives. That is, like Grossberg,
we wish to call attention to postmodernity as a process significantly Jess
totalizing, as "determining moments in culture and everyday life" (Grossberg
1988b: 39). Postmodernity in this view refers to the "growing distance, an
expanding series of ruptures or gaps, between these various aspects of
everyday life, between the available meanings, values and objects of desire
which socially organize our existence and identity, and the possibilities for
investing in or caring about them which are enabled by our moods and emotions" (p. 39). Grossberg is referring here to a feeling or sensibility that life
no longer has any fundamental purpose to which we can passionately commit
our lives. He puts it aptly when he remarks that our "mattering maps no
longer correspond to any available maps of meaning" (p. 40). Postmodernity
is, in short, a crisis of meaning and feeling: "a dissolution of what we might
call the 'anchoring affect' that articulates meaning and affect" (p. 40). One of
the dangers of postmodern culture is the establishment of what Grossberg
calls a "disciplined mobilization" by which he means "the construction of a
frontier as an unbridgeable gap between the livable and the unlivable, the
possible and impossible, the real and the unreal" (p. 37). A disciplined
mobilization refers to the temporal and spatial articulation of texts through
social practices which give us both stability and mobility within everyday life.
It "defines the very possibilities of where and how we move and stop, of
where and how we place and displace ourselves, or where and how we are
installed into cultural texts and extended beyond them" (p. 36-37). Such a "typography of cultural practices" defines the sites within culture we can occupy,
the investments we can make in them, and the places along which we can
connect and transform them. Grossberg is specifically concerned here with
the increasing ability of the New Right to develop ideological and affective
alliances among social groups. That is, if we look at the postmodern frontier
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as a site of struggle among discourses, material practices, and representations,

we can argue, along with Grossberg, that the New Right has been able to
rearticulate, reconstruct, and reterritorialize the "national popular" (the
family, nationalism, consumerism, youth, pleasure, heroes, etc.) against itself
as affectively charged but ideologically empty. One example of this is the
ability of New Class neo-conservatives to manipulate traditional populism
(Picone 1987-88: 21).
Youth and Postmodern Apathy
Even in this postmodern era, the ideological hegemony in the United
States, while irredeemably condemnable and undeniably powerful, is not
without its contradictory moments. Students oftentimes see the critical
educator's concern for community and social justice as a threat to their
general ideological commitments. Critical pedagogy becomes, for many
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students an uncomfortable and self-contesting exercise. They are reluctant or
refuse t~ question meanings, preferring instead to live them. . .
.
We don't want to absorb student apathy about polit:lcs and social
change into traditional political categories and end up by offering yet another
"blaming the victim" analysis of the ideological formation of today's youth.
Rather, we want to acknowledge that there are historical conditions which
account for youth resistance and apathy to schooling. For instance, Grossberg
notes that ''youth inserts cultural texts into its public and private lives in
complex ways and we need to be aware of the complexity and contra~ctory
nature of youth's social and political positions" (1988a: 139). Grossberg nghtly
recognizes that in our postmodern era, young people exist within the space
between subjectification (boredom) and commodification (terror). Our media
culture has become a "buffer zone," a "paradoxical site" at which the youth

of today live out a difficult if not impossible relation to the future. In fact,
Grossberg argues that American youth have largely been formed out of the
media strategies of the "autonomous affect" in which politics, values, and

meaning have been reduced to individualized images of morality, self-sacrifice, and community. They are living the surface identities of media
images in which the politics of interpretive insight is replaced by the politics
of "feeling good."
For instance, Grossberg points to one cultural struggle in which the
New Right has taken the lead: the attack on the counterculture of the sixties
and seventies, in part through its ability to reconstruct the history of the war
in Vietnam. A brief treatment of such a reconstruction will help to illustrate
Grossberg's point.
Vietnam was a war fought by youth (the average age of a combat
soldier was nineteen) and became "the symbol of the moment when the identification of the postwar youth generations with America fell apart and
consequently, the moment when America lost, not only its center but its faith
in a center" (Grossberg 1988b: 56). Yet popular narratives in the media now
attempt "to place the war back into the familiar frameworks of traditional
war narratives or personal drama" (p. 57). The existence of the counter-culture at that time is generally ignored in popular representations of the war.
Rather, the war is interpreted as an attack on America and its sacred values-"the moment when the postwar youth generations lost their faith, not only in
America, but in the possibility of ever finding a center, an identity, in which
it could invest" (p. 58). The effect of ignoring the counter-culture is to
displace "the ideological content from youth culture and [transform] it into
purely affective relations" (p. 59)--or "affective nostalgia." That there exist
few grounds presently available to students upon which to imagine constructing an oppositional or counter-hegemonic pedagogical stance in a cultural
center with nc real ideological content--only feelings--makes the challenge of
critical pedagogy all the more acute and all the more pressing.
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Aside from youth's subjective formation through the "affective
alliances" of mass media, part of the problem with the refusal of youth to
engage in issues of class oppression and social injustice both inside and
outside the classroom has to do with the fact that within the United States,
the question of domination and oppression is not as overtly evident as it is,
for instance, in many Third World countries. United States civil society is less
simply structured by divisions based on the conflict of labor and capital.
Consequently, class relations do not appear to cause social inequality and
consequently there is a greater focus on oppressive instances of gender
divisions, age differences, and ethnic conflict. In other words, we do not live
within structures of terror such as those found, for instance, in El Salvador or
Guatemala, where workers are frequently dispatched by a coup de grace
through the forehead. Furthermore, collective action does not seem as
necessary within a climate of political and cultural pluralism, although the
presence of the black underclass and the homeless is somewhat changing this
spectatorial detachment towards human oppression. The point is that class,
gender, and racial oppression do exist, regardless of the perception by the
public-at-large (Baum 1987).
Grossberg admits that given the New Right's incursion into the
frontier between affect and ideology, where only or mainly emotional responses are possible without the benefit of ideological understanding or
commitment, there is little room for Gramsci's "optimism of the will" so ne-

cessary for political struggle, for understanding and confronting affective
commitment outside of the system of cultural power within which such an investment is constructed, and for assuming a necessary relationship between
affective investment and external systems of meaning. For instance, the desire
among conservatives and die-hard "patriots" to make flag burning a crime
(whether by constitutional amendment or civil blasphemy statute) as a
reaction against the recent United States Supreme Court ruling, is an excellent example of affective commitment in which patriotism is constructed, in
Grossberg's terms, as an "empty center" devoid of the kind of ideological
engagement that makes it impossible to undermine any definition of what
America means other than absolute commitment to America itself. 2
It is our view that in relation to what is happening on the popular
front, critical pedagogy must become a strategic and empowering response
to those historical conditions which have produced us as subjects, and to the
ways we are inserted on a daily basis into the frontier of popular culture and
existing structures of power. It is our claim that a clarification of some of the
practices of critical pedagogy can, as a form of intellectual labor, have
transformative effects, enabling us to deconstruct and move beyond affective
investments "to a higher level of abstraction in order to transform the empirically taken-for-granted into the concretely determined" (Grossberg, 1988b:
68). We attempt such a clarification in the pages that follow.
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Educational Responses
to the Postmodern Condition
In the following sections we shall attempt to s~etch. out the em~r
gence of critical pedagogy and respond .to som~ thet;>retical d.ilemmas. which
still plague its development and confuse 1ts relatmnship to the 1s~ues raised by
postmodern social theory. We have chosen to focus on four major areas:. t~e
epistemological beginnings of critical ~dagogy; the cha!l~nge of a fem1rust
pedagogy of the colonized woman; the 1mport~nce of critical peda!logy as a
counter-hegemonic practice; and the constructmn of the self-reflexive agent.
Critical Pedagogy:
Epistemological Beginnings
Curriculum theory developed out of the social. efficien.cy mo.vement
of the early part of this century and its most conserva~1ve. manifestat~on was
primarily tied to behavioral management t?eory. At this time, education was
primarily geared to prepare students to. dire~tly en~er ~he. adult labor force
in order to stabilize the social order and its adjacent mshtutmns. I.n the l~s,
a more progressive approach to curriculum theory and plannm!! gr":w m
popularity which was grounded in empirical r.esearch and. served p~1m.anly as
a means of making the curriculum more strmgently subject to pn'.'aples of
scientific verifiability and infallibility and teachers more pedagogically accountable. During this time there was a strong push to mak~ teachers more
adept at predicting and measuring be.h~~oral. outcom":s m students. By
remaining under the guidance of an empmc1st-or1ente~ ep1Stemol?gy (b.Y way
of the scientific method), curriculum theory and practice tur'.'ed 1ts~lf mto a
quest for truth and reliability. Today, these two ~pproaches still dommate the
field of curriculum studies as the search contmues for a causal theory to
explain student learning behavior, ~refer~bly in a preci~e an~ clear conceptual
language aided by an instrumentatmn smted to q~antificatmn.
A third approach to the study of curnculum and pedago~ first
gained national attention in the United States and Canada appro~a.tely
fifteen years ago, largely in response to th": postmodern .challenge to traditmnal scientific research and to the truth drums upon which such research was
based. The critical education tradition owes its present theor~tical. devel?pment to a number of disciplinary trajectories and .Pe~spechves mcludmg,
among others, social meliorism (social reconstruct10n1Sm), .t~e Fra~urt
school of critical theory, the sociology of knowledge, ~nd fe~101St ~tud1es. It
is an approach which character~s itself as "~penly 1de.o~~gtc~;'. 1~ nature,
arguing that if we have entered mto an era of post-pos11lvism, 11 is neces-
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sary to defme one's bias in favor of effecting tra11Sformative social change
(Lather 1986). Here the researcher assumes the role of social critic whom,
in Rosaldo's words,
is connected to a community, not isolated
and detached. Rather than work downward
from abstract principles, social critics work
outward from in-depth knowledge of a specific form of life. Informed by such conceptions as social justice, human dignity, and
equality, they use their moral imagination
to move from the world as it actually is to
a locally persuasive vision of how it ought
to be. (1989: 194)
Since the early days of its development, the substantive task of this
tradition has been--and to a large extent still is--to uncover the contradictions
and mystifications of predominately liberal and conservative ideologies within
dominant approaches to educational theory and practice, precisely as they
have served in the reproduction of inequality and exploitative social and
economic relations and practices.

In contradiction to empiricist and traditionalist approaches, the
critical educational tradition--or ucritical pedagogy," as it is sometimes

called--is based on a philosophy of praxis engaged in an open dialogue with
competing conceptions of how to live meaningfully in a world confronted by
pain, suffering, and injustice. There exists, according to this tradition, the
necessity of struggle because there exists in modern capitalist society instances of suffering and domination. (We are aware here that the term
"tradition" as we are using it may exhibit a tendency to romanticize what is,
in essence, a body of work which exists on the borderline between contemporary theorizing and pedagogical practice.)3 Domination manifests itself in
different ways on the horizon of our lived experience. For instance, it occurs
when teachers present students with interpretations of the world which mask
or conceal the scope of political possibility and human capacity. At a more
general societal level, we define domination after Brenkman as the "socially
organized forms of exploitation, coercion, and nonreciprocity which structure
the uses that one individual or group makes of another for the satisfaction of
its own need... that individuals or groups are made to serve as wealth, as the
source of others' satisfactions, without controlling the products of their own
labors or enjoying the recognition of their own desires--this is the condition
of domination" (1987: 230-31).
Those who work within the critical tradition tend to reject what some
postmodern theorists consider to be inevitable: the flattening or disappearance of history into the commodification of the sign. Rather, critical
pedagogy is essentially a politics of living in which teachers and students are
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engaged in the work of history; as such, it is a pedagogy which deals with the
concrete relations between individuals and the cultural and institutional forms
in which such a social engagement takes place. In short, critical pedagogy is
about the problematization of language, experience, knowledge/power, and
culture, how they are mutually constitutive of subjectivity, and how their
conflation generates a particular form of praxis that acts both in and on the
world. That is, critical pedagogy wrestles with the question of how individual
subjectivity is produced through language and also by social, historical, and
economic relations. In so doing, critical pedagogy not only ruffies the complacency of most mainstream curriculu.m theor~ts, ~ut is also comm!tted to
making critical theory an ally of teaching. In this view, the pedagogical encounter between teachers and students is one in which theory and practice are
mutually informing.
While critical pedagogy has, in the past, been theoretically insistent
yet often pedagogically underdeveloped, there is a growing need to take
seriously what Henry Giroux (1988; 1989) calls making the pedagogical more
political and the political more pedagogical. Making. t.he pedagogical m<,>re
political means inserting schooling directly into the polihcal sphere by argumg
that schooling represents both a struggle to define meaning and a struggle
over power relations. Making the political more pedagogical means utilizing
forms of pedagogy that embody political interests which are emancipatory in
nature; that is, utilizing forms of pedagogy that treat students as critical
agents and hold knowledge open to analysis and investigation.
Critical pedagogy is essentially a hybrid pedagogy; it is naturally
amphibious. It is accustomed to differing intellectual climates yet it calls on
one disciplinary domain its home. Critical pedagogy is ethically rooted in
addition to being theoretically grounded; the ethical stance it assumes calls
us as teachers, parents, students, and administrators to be held accountable as
critical citizens to transform the maldistribution of wealth and resources, the
pauperization of children, and the feminization of poverty caused by existing
economic structures and the various and social practices which either directly
or indirectly serve to sanction their operations. This means helping both
students, teachers, and administrators develop a moral vision and practical
ethics grounded in a politics of difference. That is, critical pedagogy aims to
both affirm and render problematic the multiplicity of voices students bring
with them into the classroom and transform them in the interest of social and
cultural justice.
Critical pedagogy is concerned with the question of how societies
reproduce themselves through their school systems and how schools reproduce social injustice by failing to produce a citizenry in which all individuals achieve equal educational outcomes. The main issue here, of course,
is why, in the United States and Canada, groups such as Blacks, Hispanics,
and native peoples drop out (or, as Hispanic students remark, are "pushed

out") in such epidemic proportions. Given this daunting scenario, it is
imperative that we ask how teachers can affirm the voices of marginalized
students, engage them critically, while at the same time assist them in
transforming their communities into sites of struggle and resistance. For
critical educators this means that within the context of the larger society,
schools must be reconceived as sites of cultural disjuncture, as convulsions
within the operating logic of capitalism, and as counter-hegemonic spheres
which generate unprecedented possibilities for social critique and utopian
thinking. 4
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Empires in Retreat:
The Challenge or a Feminist Pedagogy or the Colonized Woman
We want to argue that our postmodern condition has made it more
urgent for critical educators to develop a theoretical basis for a feminist
pedagogy. This is especially true in the way in which postmodernist social
theories have sometimes labelled themselves as "postfeminist." We draw
attention to the way in which deconstruction of the female subject has been
able to "reposition female subjectivity in the male subject" and promote this
deconstruction as feminist (De Lauretis, 1987: 25). We also argue that a
critical refiguration of feminist pedagogy should include as a primary referent
the concept of women as a colonized people. When Robin Morgan formally
posed an analogy between women and colonized peoples over twenty years
ago, she was accused of "going too far" (Morgan 1968: 161). Yet over the
past decade, we have witnessed a moderate re-emergence of this metaphor
in the writings of a number of scholars. It is harclly surprising that the
majority of this work is taking place within what is loosely described as the
feminist terrain. Within this "terrain," there are only a few--primarily those
feminists who define their scholarship as "socialist feminist," "radical,"
"meta-theoretical feminist," and/or "gyn/ecological"--who are addressing
themselves specifically to this concern. To begin to consider the validity of the
claim--that women are a colonized people--appears to necessitate the development of an epistemological shift characteristic of the liberationist strand of
postmodernist social theorizing which has occurred in a number of theoretical
orientations in which the condition of women has been traditionally studied.
The generation of a multi-layered dialectical approach inherent in the
wide variety of feminist approaches is a response to the poverty of certain
theories of oppression and/or sexism to describe the pervasiveness of the
complexities involved in the concrete conditions of women's position within
neocapitalism. As O'Brien explains:
The need to develop a theoretical basis for
a feminism which can transform the world
is an increasingly recognized need in the
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women's movement. The difficulty is know·
ing where to start. We cannot philosophize
out of thin air. (1983: 4)
In light of O'Brien's premise, our discussi?n of a feminis~ P".dagogy
begins with the assertion that women are a colomzed people. This, ID turn,
leads to simultaneous investigations into both the historical evolution of
women's situations in a variety of dimensions as well as research explorations
into the type of "methodology" which would best frame our the.si~. It is in the
context of this kind of project that a dialectical process of a femtn1St pedagogy
may be realized. For, as Goulet notes:
To think dialectically is to decree the
obsolescence of cherished concepts which
explain even one's recent past. One of the
marks of a true dialectician, however, is the
ability to "move beyond" the past without
repudiating it in the name of new levels of
critical consciousness presently enjoyed.
(1974: vii)
Simply put, each level of resear~h, as it relates to women ~n?
colonization, leads to higher levels of questions about, not only the sophisticated processual nature of how colonization is articulated within Western
capitalist societies, but also the contextual epistemology necessary for beginning to understand the complexities of related practical conditions. Mary Daly
labels this kind of dialectical approach "Gyn/Ecological," which, as she puts
it " ...says exactly what I mean it to say. Ecology is about the complex web of
interrelations between organisms and their environment" (1978: 9). Embracing this kind of emergent epistemology advocated by Daly and others
liberates the researcher to explore higher levels of inquiry into a complex
system which we suspect best describes the "enigma" of the situation of
women: colonization.
It is interesting to note that a number of "humanists" have found the
metaphor of colonization appropriate for explaining the oppressed situation
of particular races and/or classes of people. However, to apply this metaphor
to an entire gender--encompassing over half the world's population--borders
on the unthinkable. Consider Morgan's experience:
When I first proposed that we view women
as a colonized people, the suggestion was
met with incredulity, even from other feminists. But what was "going too far" yesterday inevitably becomes something already
assumed, even taken for granted tomorrow. So has the theory of women's colonization been assimilated into feminist

thought. And so we go further from here.
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(1968: 160-62)

Over two decades after Morgan's observation, it is unfortunate to note that
we hav~ not travelled nearly as far as she had hoped. Nor has the overall
oppression of women been significantly reduced, as the growing feminization
of. poverty makes so uncomfo~ta~ly clear. As Bell Hooks points out, "it is
e".'dent that large numbers of md1vidual white women (especially those from
mid~~ class backgrounds) have made economic strides in the wake of
fem1D1st movement support of careerism, and affirmative action programs in
many ~rofessions. How~ver, the masses of women are as poor as ever, or
poo_rer (1984: 59). This lack of a more expansive recognition of the real
environment of women's condition leads to questions about the nature of the
pro"."ss of co.lonizatio? ..And these questions, in turn, lead to examinations of
semmal stu~:s descnbmg and/or analyzing this complicated process. It is
hardly surpnsmg that m.ost '?f. this scho!arship is written by--and is primarily
ab.out--men. Moreover, 1mphc1tly--and, m some cases, explicitly--this scholarship reflects a repugnantly anti-female bias. These writers, nevertheless
present.pow~rful statements about the position of colonized peoples, and th~
modes ID which t~~ r~les of the coloniz<:d are reinforced by both the coloni~er ~nd the positionmg of the colomzer's dominant code. Rather than
1gnonng these works due to the outstanding lacunae in their analyses a
''meta·theoretical" feminist approach encourages us to:
'
...work by identifying the male bias in established approaches. These must be examined from the perspective of women and
the implications for the field of incorporating the perspectives and interests of
. :-vomen followed through. (Smith 1979: 16)
The wr1tmgs o~ Frantz Fanon, Paulo Freire, Albert Memmi, and Jean
Paul Sart~e most cert~nly. lend themselves to a translation which identifies
and expla~n.s the col'?mzat1on of women. In addition, while recognizing the
andr?Cntnc1ty. of th~ir t1!;eories, it does not follow that we must reject the
tot~lity of th":ir projects .. We ~ critically appropriate and apply many of
their explanatmns of specific relatmns of colonized peoples to that of women.
Also, Anne Summers' brilliant analysis of the colonization of Australian
w'?men can serve-~alo~g with previously identified works--as part of the
p~1mary.texts. con~nbutmg to a .dee~er understanding of this notion. To begin
wi.th, writers m t~1s area make 1t evident that the term "colonization" is often
misused and(or mcompl.et~. The. o~er-simplified connotation of the concept,
related to stnct economic 1mpenahsm, or as the Organization of Economic
Deve!o~ment defines. i~: "Of, ~longing to a colony," is hardly an accurate
descnptmn of the reahlles of this complex and multi-leveled system As Sartre
describes it "the colonialist system is a form in motion" (Sartre 1%5: xxvii).
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What is made apparent by these critics'. is _that vio~ence is the "~earl
and soul" of colonization. Moreover, much of this violence IS never conscmusly recognized. It is often masked by terms such as oppression '.'°d/or exploit:ition (to name a few). In other words, o~e often ~10ds euphemisms for what ts,
in actuality, colonization. As Paulo Frerre explams:
Any situation in which "A" objectively
exploits "B" or hinders his [sic] pursuit of
self-affrrmation as a responsible person is
one of oppression. Such a situation in itself

black, you poor, you ugly, you a woman.
Goddam, he say, you nothing at all. (1982:
213)
Further evidence of the colonized nature of women's condition is
~evealed in Fanon's description of this process. Contrary to the dominant
ide_ol'.'gy, people. are no.t born with a "colonized mentality." Colonial charactensti~ do .not inhere 10 the genes of the dominant class, they are learned.
False h1Stones, false role models, and false expressions of a peoples' creative
pot~ntial together with socially imposed constraints that perpetuate these false
belief systems keep the colonized in their place. For the colonial is colonized
historically, socially, politically, economically, and personally. The colonizer,
through the use of "tokens" and the aid of "collaborators" ensures that the
colonized remain in a state of ufalse" or "imaginary" consciousness. In other
words, the colonized are taught to believe the dominant ideological myths
about their collective being, and act accordingly.
Living under. such a complexity of oppressive constraints, it is only
natural that the colomzed define themselves by what they are not. The non-white in white society finds an existence mediated by the white code, just as
the non-male in male society finds an existence mediated by the patriarchal
code. Under capitalism then, it is quite "normal" for the woman to find her
life mediated by what she is not. She is not male, and concurrently, not
represented symmetrically within socially defined relations of power. She is la
~olonisee. The n~mber of levels of violence imposed upon women, however,
ts related to parttcular class and/or race associations.
On another level, women who constitute part of the dominant classes,
races, and groups often do their part to oppress and violate those in subordinate positions. This is not to say, however, that these women--these "Dominant/Subordinate Others"--are not oppressed within the realms of the
pri~ege~. (For example, under capitalism, the privileged are those who are
white, middle or upper-class, and male.) Indeed, the translations of violence
to those who are def10ed as more subordinate is consistent with the colonized
mentality. It is, therefore, the real paradoxes within this process which enable
women from dominant groups to be positioned as Dominant/Subordinate
Other. Dominant refers to their particular economic, social, and racial
position, while subordinate refers to their status as second-class citizens within
not only their own social sphere but also within society as a whole. Although
the surface structure of male/female relations differ according to class and/or
race, the deep structure is similar. Simply put, colonization is a collective
experience which all women--regardless of race, class, or culture--share.
This is not to say that "collaboration" (our term to describe the role
of female anti-feminists) is the exclusive domain of the Dominant/Subordin:ite woman. On_e of the foremost characteristics of this contradictory process
ts that the ma10tenance of colonization through its hegemonizing process
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constitutes violence, even when sweetened

by false generosity, because it interferes
with man's [sic] ontological and historical
vocation to be fully human. With the
establishment of a relationship of oppression, violence has already begun. (Freire,
1972: 40-41)
Indeed, the recognition of this common thread .of _violenc~ embroidered
throughout this polymorphic process, called colonizatmn, radically reframes
our perception. As Wilden points out:
We have watched the violence of the world
economic system being directed at group
after group on this tiny planet--physical
violence, logical and psychological; violence
verbal and non-verbal; violence sexual,
political, ecological, and social.(1~80: 3~)
. .
However, as Wilden acknowledges, "rela!lvely httle of this violence
.. .is aimed at male WASPS like me" (p. 35).
Therefore, whenever any group, race, or class are oppressed, women
exist at the center of the violence. Women are a part of every people, and
part of every situation where people have _be.en forced into subordinate
positions. Further investigation reveals that wit~ oppressed grou~s, w~men
bear a double weight. They are not only be10g oppressed by dom10ant
others," exploiting the particular race, cl~ss, or gr'.'up to which they belong;
they are also being oppressed by the violence directed at them by other
members of their own class, race, or group; i.e., males. These women constitute what Rowbotham calls "a colony within a colony'' (Rowbotham 1974:
206).
For an especially forceful illustration of this translated, colonized
violence we can turn to Alice Walker's Pulitzer Prize winning film, The Color
Purple. Consider how Walker's protagonist, Celie, describes her husband's
response to the news that she is leaving him:
He laugh. Who you think you is? he say.
You can't curse nobody. Look at you. You
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generates the complicity of the colonized in their own oppression. And t_his
complicity is partly due to the role of collaborators. Hence, by concentrat10g
on the differences between themselves and less fortunate women, rather than
embracing the "sisterhood" of all women, they are reinforcing and perpetuating their -own, and other women's, colonization.
Underlying Fanon's well documented analysis of th7 ~omplexiti~s
embedded in this system is the importance of paradox, contradichon, and difference:
At opportune moments [the colo~r) co?'bines his policy of brutal repression with
spectacular gestures of friendship, maneuvers calculated to sew division, and "psychological action." Here and there be tries
with success to revive tribal feuds, using
agents provocateurs and practicing what
might be called counter subversion. (Fanon 1961: 136)
Moreover, any questions we may have about the role of anti-feminists as
collaborators are dismissed in view of their anti-abortion platform. As
Summers reminds us:
Once women's bodies are recognized as a
form of territory the description of their
position as being one of colonization stops
being metaphorical and assumes the status
of political analysis. Women are colonized
by being denied control over their bodies.
The main purpose of colonization is to
ensure that women will continue to reproduce. (Summers 1975: 200)
To respond to the challenge of the colo~ization of w?men ~ the
present historical juncture, and in the North ~encan c~ntext m parhcula~,
educators must fmd a way of making female v01ces heard m classroo~s. This
follows Hooks' dictum that "women need to know that they can reiect the
powerful's definition of their reality--that they can do so even if they are poor,
exploited, or trapped in oppressive circumstances. They need to know that
the exercise of this basic personal power is an act of resistance and strength"
(1984: 90). To achieve this, pedagogy needs to be gro'!nded in a meta-theore~
ical paradigm which is both contextual and reflextve. Our programmaltc
beginning is an argument against the Cartesian logic of one poss7ss~~ a
defmitive theory to explain the complexities and levels of female. su~iectlVlty.
Essentially, we are calling for further development an.d apph~ho~ of. a
meta-theoretical feminist pedagogical approach, one which ts dialechcal 10
nature. Through this process, rather than being deceived by absolute answers,
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new levels of questions are raised.
As Gregory Bateson says, quoting e. e. cummings, "Always the more
beautiful answer who asks the more difficult question" (Bateson 1979: 235).
For feminists, then, that means forever criticizing what we think we know.
The following comment by Eichler captures the underlying essence
of the approach we are advocating:
... to assess the contributions of feminist
approaches to existing substantive areas
within [sociology) ...is difficult in that the
components of feminist research... involve
a blurring of current disciplinary and
sub-disciplinary boundaries. (1985: 624)
It has been our intent in this section to promote further discussion of the
need for this kind of "contextual/holistic" which O'Brien refers to as "metatheory'':
What is being proposed is the development
of metatheory from a feminist perspective,
with the assumption that theory of this kind
is essential to the dialectical tasks of understanding and changing the world. (1981:
185)
In our view, the role of women as resistors to the prevailing cultural
hegemony should not be modelled on some Hegelian vision of dialectical
transcendence or some picture of a homogeneous community. In fact, the role
of feminist pedagogy and feminist activism should take on, in our mind,
Taussig's "decentered character of the shaman" who serves as a stage "on
which the contradictions of society are acted out" (1986: 444). The shaman's
effect lies in "juxtaposing to a heightened sense of reality, one of fantasy--thereby encouraging among the participants speculation into the whys
and the wherefores of representation itselr' (p. 445). In this view, the technique of criticism is not to be tightly bound to a notion of the truth hidden
under layers of mystifications. Rather, criticism and discovery should become
an "experiment" which employs a language and praxis "that breaks open the
conventions of language and the signifying function of signs" (p. 442).
This model runs against the grain of modernist social theorizing
which attempts to create a totalizing, homogeneous unity. As Taussig
remarks, "forcing such unity may fit well with certain fantasies of maleness
and fascism" (p. 442). In contradistinction to this, our view of feminist theory
implies a better "fit" with Benjamin's notion of the dialectical image and with
"the nonwhite, nonhomogeneous, fragmentedness of montage, which on
account of its awkwardness of fit, cracks, and violent juxtapositionings, can
actively embody both a presentation and a counterpresentation of the historical time which through conquest and colonialism matches signs with their
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meanings" (p. 443).
.
In summary, we are claiming that women are, in reality, a colomzed
people. As such, their oppression is more specific and of more serious
consequence than is suggested by most theories that seek to explain the
oppression of women either by the "act of capitalism" or by the "fact of
biology" alone. We have attempted to illustrate why and how many feminist
theories have been unable to recognize and therefore unable to deal with the
reality of colonization. Within this context, we are calling for a "meta-radical
feminist approach" (as Daly describes it) as an important emphasis in critical
pedagogical approaches that attempt to take the oppression of women in our
culture seriously. Moreover, the development of this type of emergent
epistemology is often mediated by the investigation of particular practical
relations. In other words, there is a dialectical relationship between theory
and practice. Zillah Eisenstein elaborates on the necessity of this emancipatory form of "collaboration" by voicing concern for " ... constructing theory
from reality rather than plastering one onto the other, with creating a
dialectic between theory and practice rather than deriving one from the
other" (1979: 2).
This helps to account for why our research has not included any
claims to present any kind of definitive study and/or literature review of
"feminist methodology." Nor do we have any pretensions about providing a
"neat-theoretical solution" for changing women's position within the patriarchal hierarchy. Rather, our work has been designed to contribute to the
on-going development of a radical epistemology to which we hope feminist
educators will respond in their pedagogical approaches within the classroom.
A commitment to this kind of meta-theoretical framework, we propose,
identifies and clarifies the complicated nature of the colonization process.
Critical Pedagogy and the Construction
of the Self-Reflexive Agent
In this section we wish to clarify the confusion that has developed
around the topic of critical self-reflection, specifically the modernist position
which asserts that the self constitutes itself through acts of will alone, and the
postmodernist charge that the self is "always already" constituted as a fiction
of discourse. While it is important to take seriously the conditions of postmodernity as they have been variously portrayed by Baudrillard, Lyotard, and
others, we do not consider massified humanity to be so easily transmuted by
the sign into hapless, passive dupes. Nor do we agree that the human subject
can, in fact, be reduced to a pirouette of linguistic signs, regardless of how
dazzling the theory.
While we do agree with the poststructuralists who remorselessly
decry the essentialist readings of the "self," and who claim that we cannot
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speak of the self as an essence or unmediated object of reflection, we disagree that the self is primarily constituted by the process of being interpellated by discourse. Human beings--bodies--are self..:onscious rather than
self..:onstituting. That is, they are constituted partly by their self-consciousness but also by conditions which lie outside of consciousness. That is, we are
constituted as "selves" by that which we are both aware and unaware and that
which we repress. This is not the same as agreeing with Althusser that the
autonomous subject is merely a fiction of discourse upon which all other
fictions of ideology rest. We agree that to recognize ourself as a self-aware
ego to some extent depends upon ideological distortion and a repression of
the constituents of our making. However, unlike Cartesian psychological
selves, we do not individuate our own consciousness. But we are nevertheless
self-conscious enough to recognize our own constitution outside of the
exigencies of our own volition (Turner 1983). Our self-consciousness of the
constitution of our self is what makes liberation possible. The task of critical
pedagogy is to increase this self-consciousness, to strip away ideological
distortion, and to assist the subject in its own historical remaking. As Freire
(1985: 70) notes, "subjects are capable of entertaining the result of their
action even before initiating the action."

Since we recognize ourselves most fully as subjects within a particular
descriptive or explanatory language--or ideologies--we need a critical language
that enables us to both identify ourselves and recreate ourselves as active
subjects in history and distinguish our real needs from manufactured desire.
Our needs are knowable only mediately through our understanding of the
external social conditions which generate them and critical pedagogy in this
context provides by way of strategic imperatives, a pedagogy that assists
students and teachers in better knowing themselves (Giroux & McLaren
1987).
While critical educators may acknowledge, along with postmodern
social theorists, that there is less stabilization in the referential dimension of
mass culture than there used to be, there remains little room for cynicism
about the possibilities which exist for transforming structures of oppression
into structures of freedom. To be critical is to live a project charged with
hope and what Giroux calls a "language of possibility" (Giroux 1983). We
agree with Burger that "we can escape the dissemination of intentions into
the chain of signifiers. The ideological ruptures within every historical
situation enable us to develop alternatives of thought that do approximate an
understanding of experience" (1984: xxix). To be critical, therefore, is not to
be cynical. To be cynical is to believe, as some postmodern theorists tell us,
that we, as human agents, are simply the invention of discourse. To be cynical
is to extract hope from a vision of the future. To be critical, on the other
hand, means to jettison any purely contemplative cognitive distance over and
above the world, but to confront the contingency of the present with radical
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hope (McLaren 1989)--that is, with a hope that, while eschewing certainty,
seeks a praxis in the provisional unity of thought and action (McLaren 1989).
We are speaking here about a praxis in which the knowing subject is an acting
subject, a praxis in which we take responsibility for history and for a vision of
the world which is "not yet" (Simon 1987: 370). This is not to deny the
historicism of praxis but to embrace praxis more fully with a recognition that
our responsibility as educators means seizing the stage of history in the unity
of our thinking and doing, and bringing forth a new world at the command of
our own voices and with our own hands. To be critical means understanding
our relational engagement with the world and recognizing our active participation in the production of knowledge in its moral, political, and cultural
dimensions. To be a critical educator is to reproach the world, to brand it as
a tainted reflection of what it could, in fact, become. It is to conjure within
the sociological imagination, a new image of the pedagogical agent. It is the
image of the educator who possesses the willingness to engage the world so
as to change it, an image of the educator who refuses to be extracted from
history and who is determined to be fully conscious and present in history,
that is, to be fully present in the everyday, sensuous and practical world of
meaning.
Postmodern social theory has revealed to us that individuals are not
external, unchanging entities but possess subjectivity which is shaped by the
moment-by-moment contingencies of social life. People create meaning in
unique ways not because of their genetic constitution but because of the
constitution of their cultural histories and the language they use to mediate
their personal experiences: in short, by the radical contingencies of life in the
chamber of the social.

tion and the will to power forged within the postmodern economies of
representation as fundamental determinants of oppression, critical educators
nevertheless insist that there is no way to completely obliterate the possibility
of contestation and transformative struggle. The crucial insight here is that
what is often mistaken as student failure due to personal attributes such as
laziness or lack of ability, or cultural deprivation of some sort is, in effect, a
form of resistance to class, cultural, racial, or gender oppression (Giroux,
1983; McLaren, 1989; Fagan, 1989). If this is the case, then as critical educators we must concern ourselves with making schools relevant to and transformative of the lives of students.
If we want to take seriously student resistance, then there are a host
of questions we must attempt to answer: How are the identities, dreams,
desires, and needs of students forged by the media, by television, by leisure
activities, by institutions such as the family, and by cultural forms such as rock
n' roll and music videos? How, for instance, are students' conceptions of
politics socially constructed? How are their images of male and female
socially constructed? It is imperative that as educators for the postmodern age
we begin to examine issues such as feminization and masculinization of the
body. We need to study how our desires and needs and those of our students
have been shaped through dominant cultural forms.
But if we try not to treat questions of culture and the construction of
subjectivity as isolated processes, antiseptically removed from larger economies of power and privilege, a more fundamental question comes into relief:
How do we construct a new social order based upon compassion and solidarity out of the micropolitics of our classroom practices? This means not only
interrogating the microeconomies of power and privilege in our classrooms
and schools, but understanding how these economies work in relation to the
larger social order. This means analyzing and challenging those aspects of
both liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism which partake of the systemic
roots of human suffering and degradation. We need a language in which, to
quote Grossberg, we can "act locally and think globally'' (Grossberg 1988:
146). This means, of course, an integration of microsocial analysis and
macrosocial theory as well as the development of a dialectical relationship
among economic-material analysis, ideology critique, and a critical hermeneutics.
We want to argue that critical pedagogy needs to present a case, not
for glorifying the act of interpretation or celebrating the contingency and
partiality of knowledge, but for emphasizing its constitutive relationship to
power and the social. Here we are sympathetic to Sarup's (1989: 148) call for
"a model that overcomes the opposition between the individual and the social,
because no political revolution can be completed until the 'character struc-
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Critical Pedagogy
as a Counter-Hegemonic Practice
In this section we wish to establish the position that in the postmodern era of neo-capitalism, critical pedagogy must take a definitive stance
against oppression. When, under capitalism, the structural configurations of
subjectivity become pathological, or when the logic of capital is mobilized
within mechanisms of domination that can demonstrably be shown to reproduce pain and suffering among subordinate groups, then critical pedagogy
must take on an important transformative mission. Critical pedagogy must
become a means of counter-hegemony or a means to counter-hegemony.
More specifically, it must become a theoretical and strategic method of
uncovering the manner in which ideological contradictions are resolved at the
imaginary level in the individual subject; it must also become a means of
politically contesting the structures of domination within consumer capitalism.
While acknowledging the priority of the social relations of capitalist produc-

tures' inherited from prerevolutionary society are transformed."
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Conclusion
It is important that critical educators do not choose to suffer from
the chronic dream of totality and completeness in their theoretical formulations. Rather than undertaking the task of charting out a grand theory, critical
educators should begin to connect the cause of social transformation to a
more inclusive view of the project of critical pedagogy unburdened by the
narrowness of vision that has characterized so many radical educational
projects of the past which have allowed themselves to work simply within the
context of ideology critique, class analysis, or gender analysis. By recasting t.he
task of critical pedagogy in a language of possibility, it can be connected more
persuasively and passionately with a view to what it means to be truly empowered. In doing so, critical educators must seek to create social spaces
which break down the tightening grasp of social division and hierarchy and
build upon what Roberto Unger calls "the embodiment of human solidarity''
(Unger 1987: 212), a task that makes "it possible to achieve a wholehearted
engagement in our societies that does not rest on illusion and bad faith" (p.
212). That is, it remains the task of critical pedagogy to construct a praxis for
teachers that urges an active solicitude for the marginalized and dispossessed,
both male and female, those who have been vanquished by the incursion of
~e logic of capital into both the rural and urban landscapes of North America.

.
. T~e pr~s to. wh.ich w_e have ~p~ken throughout this essay is one
w~1ch ~s bved 11_1 solidarity with all VJCtuns (male, female, white, black,
H1spamc) st!ugglmg to overco1_11.e their suffering and alienation. The irruption
of the poor m our towns and cities over the last decade demands a relocation
of schooling in a praxis of solidarity where the individual and personal is
a!ways si!uated in r~lation to the collective and communal (without the
s1mple-mmded cohesiveness that these terms usually imply). It is a praxis that
seeks to engage history with the intent of helping the powerless locate
themselves in it. This means calling teachers to a cosuffering with the oppressed as they struggle both to transcend and transform the circumstances of
their disempowerment (Chopp 1985). In other words we need to resituate the
challenge of teaching as a task of empowering the ~owerless from states of
de~ndency and P?ssivity as bot~ an informed movement for revolutionary
social and economic transformat10n and as a means of achieving what Brian
Fa~ calls a "state of reflective clarity'' (1987). This is a state of liberation "in
which people know which of their wants are genuine because they know
finally who they really ar~, and ? state of collective autonomy in which they
have the power to determine rahonally and freely the nature and direction of
their collective existence" (p. 205).
.
I.n searching for the nonidentity constitutive of a genuine experience
of liberation, we seek to avoid becoming trapped within a totalizing negativity
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--what we refer to as an incipient anti-utopianism, left malaise, or an entrenchment of despair characteristic of those who have abandoned a language
of hope and possibility. In addition, our theoretical approach is deliberately
cast to avoid following a preestablished scheme, formula, or script, and it is
self-consciously multidisciplinary as we have chosen to enter into collaboration
with many different types of contemporary scholarship: semiotics, hermeneutics, critical theory, liberation theology, and post-structuralism. But in
doing so, we maintain we are not moving away from the concrete but rather
towards the complexity of the concrete. In the words of Mathew Lamb:
Theory is not an impoverished abstraction
away from ...reality. Instead theory as critical
is a profound effort to understand processive reality ever more adequately. Theory,
then, does not move away from the concrete, only to be returned to it in the form
of some sort of practical application.
Instead, theory is continually moving toward
the complexity of the concrete and, in the
measure that it is correct in indicating the
underlying concrete and contradictory
tensions in reality, it is capable of guiding
the transformation of reality. (1982: 49-50)
.
T~c; pedago\!Y of ;oncrete to which we have been referring is ground~d ID a politics of ethics, difference, and democracy. It is unashamedly utopian
ID substance and scope, and articulates a vision of and for the future maintainin~ t~at if we have no idea of what we are working towards, we
never
know if, ID our struggle for human freedom, those conditions have been met
(McLaren 1989). Our thoughts and actions are thus deliberately designed to
rupture ~he unitary focity and cohesiveness of social life and resist attempts
at assertmg the homogeneity of the social and public sphere (Giroux and
McLaren 1989). We are referring here to a pedagogy that is grounded in the
imp~rt~ce of the '.'other" .and the necessity of developing a common ground
for lmki:°g ~he ;11ot1on. of difference to a publicly shared language of struggle
and social JUS!Ice (Giroux 1988). In engaging the concept of "difference"
educational theorists need to free themselves from what Rosaldo calls
"imp~rialis.t nostalgia," which refers to a longing for the very forms of life
they mtent10nally altered or destroyed, a longing for the passing of what they,
themselves, have transformed through their "civilizing mission." Rosaldo
notes that "the social analyst is always a positioned subject and that the
objects of social analysis are also analyzing subjects whose perceptions must
be taken ... as seriously as we take our own" (1989: 206). Like MacCannell, we
believe. the positive potential within postmodernity "depends on its capacity to
recognize and accept otherness as radically other...the possibility of recogniz:
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ing and attempting to enter into a dialogue, on an equal footing with forms of
intelligence absolutely different from [our] own" (MacCannell 1989: xv).
However, Rosaldo makes the point that radical otherness may not be as
radical today as it once was since:
Rapidly increasing global interdependence
has made it more and more clear that
neither "we" nor "they" are as neatly
bounded and homogeneous as once seemed
to be the case ...All of us inhabit an interdependent late twentieth century world
mauled by borrowing and lending acr~ss
porous national and cultural boundaries
that are saturated with inequality and
domination. (1989: 217)
Gloria Anzaldua's (1987) work on the subje~t at the ~os~ro~ds of
culture written from a Chicana lesbian perspective, gives us an md1cat10n of
how the new postmodern subject, moving among a multiplicity of subject
positions, might be situated:
.
The new mestiza [persons of mIXed ancestry], she says, copes by developing a
tolerance for ambiguity. She learns to be
Indian in Mexican culture, to be Mexican
from an Anglo point of view. She learns to
juggle cultures. She has a plural persona~ty,
she operates in a pluralistic mode--nothmg
is thrust out, the good, the bad, and the
ugly, nothing rejected, nothing aban~o.ned.
Not only does she sustain contrad1ct10ns,
she turns the ambivalence into something
else. (cited in Rosaldo: 216)
.
.
..
We believe that teachers working in the schools, m the uruverSI!Ies,
and in other social sites, must actively engage their students as multiple
subjects by assuming the ro~e of transformat~ve intellectuals (Giroux 1989);
they must engage in emancipatory forms of mtellectual labor and, ~s such,
become bearers of critical knowledge, rules, and values through which they
can consciously articulate and problematize the relationship among !"dividual
agency, popular culture, the state, forms of knowledge, and the wider comf d"
·
What we are arguing for is a critical pedagogy as a form o 1scurs1ve
production which drives emancil;'at~ry ~nowledge into the real':° of the
possible, putting aside levelled aspiratmns m favor of a present that IS n.ot yet.
The critical pedagogy of which we speak works agamst the conflatmn .of
description with representation, information with knowledge, language with

munity.
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reality, and the institutional and power arrangements such conflation serves.
It also works against an economy of knowledge predicated on a masculinist
vantage-point and an economy of difference placed in the service of the
dominant culture. Critical pedagogy involves what Hooks calls "coming to
voice ... as an act of resistance ...where one moves from being an object to being
a subject" (1989: 12). Hooks' feminist classroom resonates critically with the
pedagogy we have been describing, where the classroom becomes "a place
where there is a sense of struggle, where there is a visible acknowledgement
of the union of theory and practice, where we work together as teachers and
students to overcome the estrangement and alienation that have become so
much the norm" (p. 51).
The polemic of critical pedagogy (the galvanizing aspect of which we
have tied to a language of hope) is directed at encouraging, making possible,
and enabling differentiated human capacities to be realized through the
construction of social forms that inhibit the crippling distortions of social and
moral regulation that deny individuals from speaking out of their own
histories, traditions, voices, and personal experiences (Giroux 1988). We are
speaking here of creating social forms which are non-hierarchical, reciprocal,
and which ennoble rather than degrade human life. Instead of serving as
custodians of the status quo by engaging in pedagogical strategies which
remain atheoretical, ahistorical, and apolitical in their formulation and
practice, we believe that educators should link a theory of ethics and morality
to a politics in which community, difference, remembrance, and historical
consciousness become foundational (Giroux 1988).

Towards a Pedagogy
for the Postmodern Era
The job of the critical educator in the postmodern era is, as we see
it, to construct an emancipatory curriculum which legitimates the postmodern
condition of mass culture in order to help students both criticize and transcend its most disabling conditions. We cannot, therefore, as educators, profess
indifference to popular culture because in doing so we abandon our critical
project. Students are already struggling within the domain of popular culture
and we abandon and disenfranchise our students by ignoring the politics of
the mundane and the everyday. Of course, the personal experience of students
sets the primary context for an examination of mass culture and social
institutions, which in turn becomes the groundwork for the reconstruction of
critical thought. This means taking seriously the stories students tell of their
own histories, experiences, and dreams. But while we should be committed to
affirming the always already gendered, raced, and classed voices of our
students, we should at the same time help them achieve a critical voice
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tempered by a politically informed intelligence. This is an important challenge
and one which demands a new pedagogical language.
Understood as a form of social action both on and in the world,
critical pedagogy can serve both as a counterpoint to the monodimensional
way that meaning is constructed in the classroom and as a means of interrogating the normative political language most students--both male and
female--acquire throughout schooling. In this way students can learn to
acquire the strength to exercise a critical voice capable of challenging those
voices of accommodation which celebrate a uniform public morality and a
monolithic political reality based on labor market imperatives and cultural
consensus.
In building our programs of critical pedagogy we must heed Freire's
warning and avoid the North American logic of the "quick fix." Freire warns
that curriculum programs which attempt to give step-by-step recipes are really
forms which domesticate the mind. Rather than following somebody else's
carefully formulated blueprint for critical teaching, teachers should work
collectively in analyzing and examining the contextual conditions of their own
classrooms and communities so that they can construct their own pedagogical
models of teacher and student empowerment.
In closing, we would like to suggest that it is critical pedagogy's place
to discover what we, as human subjects, have become--as teachers, as students, and as citizens of our communities--and what we have been unable to
question and to challenge. While postmodern social theory has taught us that
the concept of the self is often an effect of the conditions of human life which
we seek to describe, and while it may be true that there is no privileged
vantage point to subjectivity from which we can escape our own constitution
in external technologies of power, it does not follow that we should submit
ourselves without a fight to the processes which have made us who we are.
Battestini writes that "The desire to build another 'I' is a choice which ...
creates our sense of freedom ... a new dimension of the decolonized free
'I"'(1988/89: 129). The future does not belong to those who are content to
remain as they are, and who unwittingly unlearn the meaning of hope, but to
those who can think and act as critical remakers of history, and who choose
to do so.
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Reform Discourse
and Curriculum
Reform
By Catherine Cornbleth
and Esther E. Gottlieb
Discourse matters. How we see, think and
talk about, and study curriculum both reflects our
paradigmatic affiliation and its associated discursive
practices, and affects the education made available
to students. The form and substance of curriculum
discourse and practice are mutually determining. If,
for example, we conceive of curriculum as a docu-

ment of one sort or another, we are likely to focus
curriculum change efforts on changing that document. If, in contrast, we conceive of curriculum as
a contextualized social process, we are likely to
focus curriculum change efforts on changing the
social context (Cornbleth, 1988). Similarly, if our
experience with changing a curriculum document
has led to little desired change in classroom practice, we may well reject a documentary conception
of curriculum and curriculum change in favor of a
contextualized processual one.

